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Reflections on Globalisation, Security and 9/11 
 
Christopher W. Hughes 
 
Abstract 
 
The study of globalisation carries important conceptual insights into the 
contemporary security agenda following the events of 9/11. This article argues that 
globalisation can be defined in a variety of ways, ranging from liberalisation to 
Westernisation, and can also be extended into concepts of supra-territorialisation. In 
combination, these definitions help to explain the generation of 9/11 style-conflict by 
providing the political-economic motivation for hyper-terrorism, by facilitating the 
political identities and activities of non-state actors; and by creating an environment 
for the global reach of terror movements. Additionally, the interconnection between 
globalisation and security can be seen in the response of the US to 9/11 and its 
striving to project military power on a global scale with declining reference to time 
and geographical distance, and the varied ability of sovereign states to respond to the 
challenge of trans-sovereign security problems in the future. 
 
 
Security has once again reclaimed the centre stage of the international social science 
and policy agendas. The events of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing conflict in 
Afghanistan have highlighted many of the unfolding trends and complexities of 
contemporary security. A variety of social science disciplines, including International 
Relations (IR) and the traditionally diverse field of Security Studies, have already 
been brought to bear in order to provide explanatory insights into the aftermath of 
9/11. It is also inevitable that another field of enquiry, globalisation studies, should be 
applied to understanding 9/11. Even if this field might not yet be confident or 
established enough in its individual status to generally speak of itself in upper case 
terms, in the discussions amongst both policy and academic circles post-9/11 there 
was a definite sense in which these events were related to the phenomenon of 
globalisation, and that those engaged in its study may possess a distinct type of 
knowledge that could contribute to the debate on security.  
The argument of this article is that the study of globalisation does indeed have 
the capability to make a distinctive and advantageous, if at times supplementary, 
contribution to the study of security after 9/11. It argues that the processes of 
globalisation themselves, defined in a variety of ways including liberalisation, 
convergence and supra-territorialisation, form one conceptual lens and explanation for 
the perpetration of and responses to violent conflict and terrorism. Although, at the 
same time, this article argues that globalisation alone is not responsible for conflict 
scenarios such as that in Afghanistan, but needs to be understood in combination with 
other fundamental or ‘conjunctural’ shifts in the international structure, including 
decolonisation and bipolarisation. 
The study of globalisation is inherently a multidisciplinary enterprise, drawing 
in IR, International Political Economy (IPE), Economics, Sociology, History and a 
number of other fields of expertise. This type of approach is arguably less constrained 
by traditional state-centred security debates, and is thus highly suited to getting to 
grips with the complex and cross-cutting security agenda after 9/11. It offers a means 
to address its multi-actor nature in terms of the revealed (if not wholly new) 
  
proliferation of security actors; its multi-dimensional nature in comprising political-
military, economic, societal and environmental security; its multi-regional nature in 
straddling and connecting the security of a number of regions from the Middle East, 
to Africa, Europe, East Asia; and its inter-linked nature in seeing all of these actors, 
dimensions, and regions as potentially conjoined and impacting on the security of 
each.  
Alongside this exhortation to consider the post-9/11 security agenda as one 
which can be seen in many ways as something akin to a post-globalisation security 
agenda, this article also throws in three major caveats that limit its scope and 
ambition. Firstly, there is always the constant danger of over-stretching both the 
concepts of globalisation and security to the point of losing sharpness in their 
conceptual definition and explanatory power. Susan Strange chided the globalisation 
studies community by remarking that the phenomenon has been used to analyse 
everything from the Internet to the hamburger,1 and this serves as a warning that we 
should be cautious in applying globalisation to the topic of security, an already well 
developed field. There is a risk on various sides of debate of engaging in a 
‘securitisation’ exercise and simply slapping the label of globalisation on 9/11 without 
delving any deeper in our analysis.2 Those who perceive themselves as victims of the 
attacks may argue that terrorism is an anti-globalisation force, but this is a statement, 
as argued below, that can only penetrate to the truth if globalisation is carefully 
defined from different perspectives to discover the particular elements of this broad 
phenomena that the perpetrators of terror are resisting. Meanwhile, those who 
perceive themselves as victims of globalisation and its related evils, or in the policy 
and academic communities that argue the case in favour of such perceived 
victimisation, may have hit upon globalisation as a genuine force for generating 
insecurity. However, if this is as far as the examination of the globalisation-security 
nexus goes, then this runs the risk of caricaturing globalisation and halting in its 
tracks debate that can unpack the phenomenon and its political and economic 
dynamics, and in turn the effort to understand in a deeper fashion the interconnection 
with security. Unfortunately, this deeper understanding of 9/11 has not been overly 
present in much of the related analysis, with a knee jerk reaction on all sides of 
locating security with the globalisation process but without actually examining what 
the term itself means in different contexts.  
Secondly, this article should be read with the caveat that it will touch upon 
events in the Middle East, but that the author is more knowledgeable about security 
studies and globalisation in general and with particular reference to the East Asia 
region. Thirdly, this article cannot attempt to cover all the events and implications of 
9/11 simply due to the massive scope of the agenda and the limited number of words 
available.  
Nonetheless, having outlined these caveats and the risks involved, this article 
will briefly introduce some areas where the study of globalisation may add 
explanatory power to the events of 9/11 and the current attempts of Security Studies 
to grapple with its implications. The problem of conceptual clarity will be overcome 
by attempting to adopt a two-level definition of globalisation that will highlight how it 
                                                 
1 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. xiii. 
2 For examples of the debate on securitisation, see Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, Security: 
A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 23-26; and Simon 
Dalby, ‘Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary Security Discourse’, 
in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 3-32. 
  
impacts on security. The problem of how far to stretch the interconnection between 
globalisation and security will also be addressed by limiting the examination to the 
ways in which globalisation phenomena have impacted on the generation of and 
responses to violent conflict, rather than in this particular context running the whole 
gamut of potential security problems opened up by globalisation. The minimal 
knowledge of the Middle East cannot be readily overcome, but the strategy of the 
article is on the one hand to hope that some of the lessons about the impact of 
globalisation on East Asia are transferable to other regions, and, on the other, to 
simply hope that some of the insights offered resonate with those more expert in this 
region. Finally, as all events and implications of 9/11 cannot be dealt with, the 
approach of the article is simply to sample a variety of areas where globalisation has 
impacted on security and the problems of terrorism and state responses. 
 
Defining Globalisation 
 
Globalisation as Liberalisation and Convergence 
 
Globalisation is a notoriously slippery concept to define. This article suggests a two- 
step definition and understanding of globalisation as both reflexive and substantive 
processes which are dialectically related and in many cases nearly indistinguishable. 
Perhaps the most common understanding of globalisation to date has been that of 
internationalisation, implying the increasing density and interdependence of 
interaction amongst nation-states and their markets, or, more accurately, given the 
lack of congruence in many regions between state entities and their nationalist 
populations, sovereign-states. In turn, these increased flows of capital, personnel and 
knowledge generally go beyond internationalisation, which implies the state 
essentially remaining unchanged in this process, and involves the lowering of state 
borders, which then equates to the process of liberalisation.3   
The next most common definition of globalisation is derived from the general 
notion prevalent in the mass media and mass opinion of a general convergence in 
global affairs in the economic, political and other spheres of social activity. The 
convergence thesis view of globalisation finds its most extreme form in the hyper-
globalisation and ‘end of history’ literature of the likes of Kenichi Ohmae and Francis 
Fukuyama.4 However, the convergence thesis also feeds through in a variety of 
extremes into definitions of globalisation that revolve around the idea of the 
universalisation of standards of social interaction. This is at least the preferred 
understanding in the discourse of many of the most powerful government and 
institutional advocates of the benefits of globalisation in the developed world. For 
even if they may not argue consciously for universalisation and wish to acknowledge 
heterogeneity, the economic policies and Structural Adjustment Packages (SAP) 
which the international financial institutions (IFI) have championed for the 
developing world in East Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East imply at 
the very least convergence by default. From the developing world view, such policies 
which lead to convergence and universalisation can also bring about a definition of 
globalisation as Westernisation. Even less attractive is the concept of globalisation as 
                                                 
3 For this type of understanding of globalisation in government circles as internationalisation and 
liberalisation, see UK Government, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the 
Poor, White Paper on International Development, December 2000, 
http://www.globalisation.gov.uk/WhitePaper/FullPaper.pdf.  
4 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World, London, Fontana, 1990; Francis Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1992.  
  
a form of Americanisation, as the US is seen as the principal power pushing for 
convergence in ways that only serve to reinforce its global political and economic 
dominance, and that are capable of leading to accusations of neo-imperialism.5 The 
implications for security of the perceived congruence between globalisation and 
Americanisation in the generation of anti-American feeling in the case of 9/11 is 
addressed in subsequent sections. 
 
Globalisation as Supra-territorialisation 
 
Liberalisation, universalisation, Westernisation, and Americanisation are all clearly 
components of globalisation, and because globalisation is itself a reflexive process 
(often accentuated by modern telecommunications technology), where perceptions 
drive forward the process, this means that these definitions and their related 
discourses are not merely academic matters but have to be dealt with as world views 
that motivate actual political, economic and security behaviour. However, it is also 
possible to conceive of globalisation at a second and still higher conceptual level, and 
which can help to further unlock understanding of its impact upon security. Arguably, 
the above definitions fail to capture the qualitatively different nature of globalisation 
from other processes and phenomena associated with the interaction of social forces 
on a global scale. Globalisation represents a qualitatively different process due to its 
essential de-territorialisation, or stated in reverse, supra-territorialisation of social 
interaction. That is to say, globalisation is a process which increasingly reconfigures 
social space away from and beyond notions of delineated territory, and transcends 
existing physical and human borders imposed upon social interaction.6 For instance, 
global financial transactions, facilitated by information technology, can now often 
operate without reference to physical territorial distance or human-imposed territorial 
barriers. Hence, globalisation is a process facilitated by economic liberalisation and 
the growth of new technologies, but it is a process which may also go beyond these in 
its functioning and outcomes. Again, it is important to avoid the ‘hyper-globalisation’ 
thesis which views the world as moving towards a condition of being totally 
‘borderless’. For it is apparent that there is considerable territorial ‘drag’ upon the 
free-flow of globalisation forces; that not all forms of economic interaction such as 
trade and labour migration are as fully globalised as finance; that there are wide 
disparities in the degree of globalisation across different regions of the world; and, as 
pointed out in subsequent sections, that there is both resistance to and reversibility in 
the process itself.7 Nevertheless, globalisation as a process of supra-territorialisation 
is increasingly affecting large sections of the world, and must be acknowledged as a 
different, although certainly related, process to those other definitions of social 
interaction noted above. Hence, even though liberalisation, internationalisation, 
universalism, and Westernisation may eventually result in globalisation, the fact that 
they may not necessarily be entirely detached from territorialisation means that they 
remain on a qualitatively different level to the inherently supra-territorial phenomena 
of globalisation. 
 
                                                 
5 For one critical view from the developing world of globalisation as leading to the reinforcement of the 
power of the North over the South, see Martin Khor, Globalization and the South: Some Critical 
Issues, Penang, Third World Network, 2000, pp. 1-16. 
6 Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Global Capitalism and the State’, International Affairs, vol. 73, no. 3, July 1997, p. 
431. 
7 For a cautiously skeptical view of the extent of globalisation, see Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, 
Globalisation in Question, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, pp. 1-18. 
  
The phenomena of globalisation as supra-territorialisation and the 
reconfiguration of social space carries significant implications for existing forms of 
social organisation, and, most importantly in the case of security issues, the dominant 
position of the nation-state within the existing globality. Needless to say, the state 
with its exclusive jurisdiction—or in other words, sovereignty—over a particular 
social and territorial space, delineated by a combination of physical geography and 
most especially human construction, has been the basic unit for the division of global 
space in the modern era. States in the past have attempted in theory and practice to 
exercise sovereign control over all forms of social interaction in the political, 
economic, and security dimensions, both within and between their territorial borders. 
Quite clearly, and as elucidated below with reference to the post-colonial states of 
East Asia and the Middle East, not all states throughout history have been strong 
enough to be able to exercise the same degree of sovereign control and authority over 
all forms of social interaction. Nevertheless, sovereign-states rooted in territorial 
notions of social space have been the prime unit for facilitating, impeding and 
mediating interaction between the societal groups, organisations, and citizens and 
other categories of collective and individual societal units contained within their 
borders. Hence, to date, global social space has been primarily international, or inter-
sovereign-state, social space.  
However, the inherent nature of globalisation as a process which transcends 
and overrides territoriality as the dominant principle for the organisation of social 
space now poses a fundamental challenge to the sovereign-state as the basic social 
unit which exemplifies and undergirds this very territorial principle. Sovereign-states 
must contend with the freer flow of social forces on a global scale which move with 
declining reference to the previous limitations and channels imposed by state borders. 
This increasing porosity of state borders, relative decline in the de facto sovereign 
authority of states over social interaction, and corresponding increased exposure of 
‘internal’ societal groupings to ‘external forces’ (or even indeed the removal of the 
traditional domestic-international divide to create an inter-mestic arena for social 
interchange) has a number of outcomes for security discussed below. For if global 
social space has been primarily international or inter-sovereign-state space for much 
of the modern era, then the security order as one aspect of social interaction has been 
primarily built around the inter-state order. But it is clear that the security order is 
now pitted against the phenomenon of globalisation which generates security issues 
diametrically opposed to and often beyond the limits of sovereign-state authority.  
 
 
Globalisation and Security 
 
The following sections now attempt to examine how globalisation, understood in 
terms of liberalisation, convergence, and supra- or de-territorialisation, can be seen to 
motivate and facilitate the contemporary security agenda and generation of violence 
in both general terms and with specific reference to 9/11.  
 
Sovereign-state Units, Decolonisation, Bipolarisation, and Globalisation 
 
The influence of globalisation needs to be considered alongside other major processes 
which have shaped the inter-sovereign-state and related security system. The effects 
of globalisation should not be disembedded from factors of historical and regional 
contingency, and, following on this, the particular nature of the state units in each 
  
region which underpin (or in many case are increasingly failing to underpin) the 
global security order. In order to understand these state units it is thus necessary to 
remember that, prior to the advent of globalisation as the dominant perceived trend in 
regional politics, the forces of decolonisation and bipolarisation were the most active 
in shaping sovereign-states in the post-war period, and that these forces clearly had 
differential effects. In the developed world, decolonisation clearly figured less greatly 
in the reconfiguration of already well-established individual state units, many of 
which were colonisers themselves, other than to reorder their relative capacities in the 
inter-sovereign-state system. Bipolarisation served to preserve these sovereign-state 
units, if to skew the economic development of the states of the communist and non-
communist camps. In the developing world, the effects of decolonisation and 
bipolarisation were more fundamental.8 Decolonisation in Africa, East Asia and the 
Middle East brought into existence a number of new sovereign-states. In theory these 
were modelled along the lines of the sovereign and nation-states of their former 
colonial masters or the developed states, but in practice have not always conformed to 
these ideals. In many instances, the idea of the sovereign-state came before or 
diverged from that of the nation-state: shown by the fact that the territorial and 
sovereign space of states in the region was often delineated along former colonial 
borders which had been drawn arbitrarily and in contradistinction to trans-border ties 
of ethnicity and religion.  
These problems are particularly salient in East Asia and the Middle East, 
where cross-border minority groups such as the Palestinians, Kurds, Chechens, 
Karens and Timorese are often at loggerheads with the state into which they have 
been principally incorporated. Such contradictions between sovereign space and 
societal composition clearly weakened from the start the internal political cohesion of 
states in the region, and laid the ground for the potential divisibility between the 
security interests of the state and its societal constituents. Hence, these types of states 
have often been subject to internal political unrest, separatist and insurgency 
movements. Moreover, the common legacy of distorted development from the 
colonial period also placed these states in a disadvantageous economic position to 
maintain their internal stability. For instance, the preoccupation of many states in the 
East Asia region since the post-colonial has been to preserve their internal integrity by 
advancing the process of state-building, and particularly in the economic sphere, as a 
means to reconcile these structural contradictions.9 In the Middle East, the picture is a 
similar one of the forced economic integration of this region into the international 
political economy under the influence of the imperial powers, and then the continuing 
legacy of the structural dependence on raw material and oil exports and limited intra-
regional economic integration in the post-colonial period—all obliging the regimes of 
region to attempt to secure their legitimacy by state-led development policies. 
The problematic position of newly-established sovereign-states in various 
regions was also further compounded either during or immediately after the 
decolonisation phase by the impact of the onset of the Cold War. The division of 
regions between the competing ideologies and political economies of the socialist and 
capitalist blocs was to create a legacy of military confrontation and superpower 
interventionism. Just as important when considering the post-globalisation security 
                                                 
8 For an approach which combines the processes of decolonisation and globalisation to explain 
development across different regions, see Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: 
The New Political Economy of Development, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001. 
9 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the 
International System, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 21-45. 
  
agenda is the effect of the Cold War upon the state building-agendas and development 
of the political economies of many of the states in the East Asia and Middle East 
regions. The economic dispensations offered by the superpowers to allied, aligned, or 
even non-aligned states in various regions of the developing world assisted their 
economic progress but also left them ultimately vulnerable to fundamentally 
vulnerable when exposed to the forces of liberal capitalism at the end of the Cold 
War.  
Therefore, the overlapping processes of decolonisation and bipolarisation have 
had a significant impact upon the development of the sovereign-states of the 
developing world and their ability to respond to the process of globalisation. Firstly, 
these processes have created states marked by internal contradictions between the 
delineation of territorial space and societal composition, and a near ineradicable and 
potential divisibility between the proclaimed security interests of these states and 
large sections of their citizenry. Secondly, they have created states that are or will be 
increasingly driven to exploit the benefits of liberal capitalism to paper over the 
political and security cracks in their own societies, but which have been insulated in 
the past from the full effects of capitalism's tendency towards periodic crises. The end 
of the Cold War and the declining incentives on the part of the US to provide special 
economic dispensations is also exposing the states of various regions to fully-fledged 
modes of liberal capitalism and their attendant security costs. In East Asia the end of 
US dispensations was highlighted to some degree by its unwillingness to invest 
significant resources in bailing out the East Asia states from the financial crisis of 
1997 onwards. In the Middle East, it seems the end of the Cold War and collapse of 
oil prices for the oil producing countries generated major economic shocks, whilst the 
decline in US and Soviet technical, military and economic aid undermined the 
economic stability of oil and non-oil producing Arab states alike.10   
 
Motivations for Violent Conflict 
 
The analysis above of the processes of decolonisation and bipolarisation provides an 
historically contingent backdrop which helps to explain how globalisation processes 
impact on security across different sovereign-states and societies. If the first stage 
definition of globalisation as liberalisation is applied, it is immediately apparent how 
these processes have impacted on the political economies of a variety of states, which 
in turn has produced the conditions for violent conflict. Economic liberalisation in 
East Asia has produced mixed effects for economic and political stability. Firstly, 
globalisation has produced economic exclusion for states and individuals. This may 
be marked by disparities in welfare, which can feed through into military tension 
amongst states, or result in internal unrest within states. North Korea is one example 
of a state which has taken the path of autarchy and found itself lagging behind other 
states in the region economically.11 Secondly, globalisation may produce economic 
rivalry amongst states and their citizens for scarce economic resources, a constant 
potential problem in East Asia with regard to competition for energy, food and fresh 
water resources. Thirdly, globalisation may produce economic dislocation within 
states. In East Asia, this location has been marked by financial crises and the 
                                                 
10 Toby Dodge, ‘Bringing the Bourgeoisie Back in: Globalization and the Birth of Liberal 
Authoritarianism in the Middle East’, in Toby Dodge and Richard Higgott, eds., Globalization and the 
Middle East: Islam, Economy, Society and Politics, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
2002, p. 181. 
11 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Economic Power and Security: Japan and North Korea, London, 
Routledge, 1999, pp. 117-160. 
  
ingraining of poverty in certain sections of society. All these effects of economic 
liberalisation and globalisation are accentuated by the pre-existing vulnerabilities 
engendered by the effects of decolonisation and bipolarisation on the political 
economy of development in such states, and can feed through into social instability. 
In turn, these problems of instability are compounded by the often declining ability of 
states under the dominance of neo-liberal IFIs to practice policies which can 
redistribute these costs away from the most vulnerable in their societies and minimise 
internal political tensions. 
In the Middle East it would appear that globalisation in the form of economic 
liberalisation has produced similar effects. The oil producing states of the region are 
in a sense already globalised due to their high degree of dependence on the export of 
one commodity, but have also been able to insulate themselves to a certain degree due 
to their large market share and the converse dependency of foreign consumers on their 
products. However, it is also clear that states such as Saudi Arabia that have been able 
to practice a degree of autarchy in the past, which has also reinforced the autocracy of 
the ruling regime, are now facing a decline in their economic performance.  
Subsequently this presents such states with the need to further liberalise their 
economies to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), but this presents the dilemma of 
exacerbating potential internal inequalities in welfare, the exposure to external 
economic shocks, and the resulting political risks of divergent calls for both greater 
reform or to reverse reforms. This provides fertile ground for political discontent with 
the dominant regimes, and the radicalisation of Islam which forms the only outlet for 
the expression of opposition in states where political parties are banned or subjugated 
to the state. Recent bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia in early 2002, directed against 
foreigners, are evidence of the rising dissatisfaction with the Western-oriented but 
also politically rigid House of Saud. For the non-oil producing states, these dilemmas 
are even greater as they are possessed of fewer resources to cushion the economic and 
political impact of their integration into the global political economy. 
Likewise, globalisation perceived as convergence, leading to Westernisation 
or Americanisation, clearly possesses also the potential to create an environment 
conducive to political discontent. In East Asia, the confidence that many of the elites 
possessed in the prowess of their own economic management to simultaneously ride 
the wave of economic globalisation and to maintain the allegedly common bulwark of 
‘Asian Values’ against the encroachment of ‘Western Values’ accompanying 
economic development, has met a serious setback. The perceived dominance of the 
US over IFIs and its attempts to rollback the developmental state model in the region, 
resulted in resentment in varying degrees towards the US and West amongst both 
political leaders and on the ‘street’ amongst the disadvantaged.12 In the case of 
Indonesia and Malaysia, the financial crisis also raised the fears that moderate or 
secular governments may not be able to hold the line as anti-globalisation and anti-
Western sentiment combined with the radicalisation of Islam.13 Regarding the 
situation in the Middle East, there has always been strong to intense strains of anti-
Westernism amongst regime elites and the general population. But it would appear 
                                                 
12 Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japanese Policy and the East Asian Currency Crisis: Abject Defeat or Quiet 
Victory?’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 7, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 232-233; 
Richard Higgott, ‘The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment’, New Political 
Economy, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 333-356. 
13 For an analysis of the impact of the East Asian financial crisis on the Indonesia and Malaysian 
political economies and domestic politics, see Joseph A. Camilleri, States, Markets and Civil Society in 
the Asia-Pacific: The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region, Volume 1, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2000, pp. 262-290. 
  
that the concerns associated with globalisation can only add to the impetus to the 
backlash against the West and globalisation, and the US as their dominant champion.  
Meanwhile, technology, and especially information technology, as the one of 
the drivers of globalisation has also served to reinforce these potential anti-
globalisation sentiments by enabling the rapid dissemination about its effects to elites 
and masses alike. It would be too crude an assessment to state that globalisation has 
provided the only motivations for 9/11 and that its role can be conceived of as laying 
the grounds for the ‘clash of the civilisations’. Samuel Huntington’s thesis is certainly 
problematic in seeking to establish distinct cultures diametrically opposed to each 
other and bound to generate conflict.14 Moreover, it would be simplistic to ascribe 
9/11 to being purely a reaction to globalisation. It is clear that opinions on 
globalisation in the Middle East are divided between those which see their world as 
already globalised—Islam being the true form of global religion—and those that view 
globalisation as the inherent threat of convergence, universalisation, Westernisation 
and Americanisation.15 Nevertheless, globalisation’s role in challenging the existing 
state dominance of the political economies of Middle Eastern societies, its perception 
as leading to convergence, and its ability to project these perceptions into the elite and 
popular ‘global consciousness’ (to abuse Roland Robertson’s terminology which 
argues for the closure rather than exposure of cultural cleavages) through media 
organisations such as the satellite broadcasters CNN and al-Jazira, all argue that it has 
been a contributory factor in the rise of radical Islamic sentiment that found one 
motivation and expression in the terror of 9/11.16 In this sense, globalisation’s impact 
on security may be seen to follow the Huntington thesis more than that of Fukuyama, 
even if the latter’s predictions on convergence may be one principal motivating factor 
for conflict.  
 
 
Facilitation of Conflict 
 
Globalisation defined as liberalisation, convergence and its higher definition of supra-
territorialisation, also offers a perceptual tool for understanding how terrorist acts 
such as 9/11 have been facilitated. In terms of actors, globalisation’s challenge to 
sovereignty opens up a range of new political identities for non-state actors in the 
global political economy. As noted above, the attempt to construct states that control 
social interaction within a delimited territorial space has also often meant attempt to 
shoehorn political identities within this state construction. Most typically this 
construction has been underpinned by the close association between the state and its 
citizenry in the form of nationalism. However, this association between the apparatus 
of the state and its population is clearly challenged by globalisation as a process of 
economic liberalisation which transcends sovereign borders and the capacity of states 
to deal with trans-sovereign problems. The result of this can be for the citizenry of 
states to look to alternative political identities distanced from the sovereign-state and 
inter-sovereign-state systems. These new identities may take the form of nationalism 
which transcends state borders, leading to problems of separatism of irredentism. It 
may also take the form of non-state-centred forms of political identity and activity.  
                                                 
14 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of the Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, 1993, pp. 
22-49. 
15 Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East and the Politics of Differential Integration’, in Dodge and Higgott, 
Globalization and the Middle East, pp. 42-45. 
16 Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London, Sage Publications, 
1992, pp. 8-9. 
  
The most positive manifestation of this movement is often viewed as the 
growth of what has been termed as ‘global civil society’ to complement efforts at 
global governance, manifested in the increasing policy input of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGO).17 More worrying from the Western perspective has been the 
rise of global ‘uncivil society’, whereby individuals and groups can forge a common 
cause across sovereign-state boundaries. These groups may consist of trans-sovereign 
crime groups which enjoy a form of political identity, as in the separatist groups in 
Burma which fund their campaign from the narcotics campaign.18 But they may also 
have a sharper political identity still and have a strong trans-sovereign movement with 
implications for security.19 Arguably, the Al Qaeda network is one such movement, 
which draws it strength to some degree from traditions of pan-Arabism and a common 
Islamic identity, and is facilitated by the rise of globalisation which engenders and 
enables the articulation of such a trans-sovereign political and cultural identity.  
In addition, globalisation has manifestly also facilitated the actual terrorist 
activities of Al Qaeda. Globalisation, again in conjunction with the effects of 
decolonisation and bipolarisation, has eroded the sovereignty of states, and it is in the 
areas where the sovereign control of states is weakest—most notably Afghanistan and 
Somalia—where terrorist networks have accumulated. For such states are where the 
remit of the central government often fails to run and where groups can practice illicit 
activities relatively free from interference. Beyond providing a conceptual map to 
identify sites of the basing of terrorists, globalisation also enhances our understanding 
of the means by which these networks are able to operate within other societies. 
Globalisation as economic liberalisation and the transcendence of sovereign control 
over social interaction, spurred on by improvements in transportation and information 
technology, has enabled trans-national crime and terrorist organisations to mimic the 
behaviour of transnational corporations (TNC), and to move with greater ease across 
deregulated economic and territorial space.20 Terrorist organisations are also now able 
to strike against their targets without even necessarily an attack on their territory per 
se. In the case of the US, the defence of its homeland now comprises its physical 
sovereign territory and the extension of its economic presence to the domain of 
cyberspace engendered by modern telecommunications technology. In this way, Al 
Qaeda has been able to exploit the open societies of the West to perpetrate terror, and 
to gain the resources to do through money laundering and the partial exploitation of 
globalised financial networks.21 As President George W. Bush noted in a speech to 
Congress on 20 September 2001, terrorist organisation such as Al Qaeda have now 
acquired ‘global reach’.22
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The response of the US and other coalition states to 9/11 also provides interesting 
insights into the interconnection between understandings of globalisation and the 
contemporary security agenda. One observation that has emerged from recent events 
after 9/11 is that the onset of globalisation is neither inevitable nor irreversible, and 
thus its impact on security can also be channelled and shaped. Contrary to the 
predictions of the hyper-globalists, the sovereign-state retains considerable flexibility 
to not only take a transformationalist path under conditions of globalisation, but also 
to firmly re-orient or even reverse the process if necessary. The concerted action by 
the US and its allies against international money laundering is one demonstration that 
the sovereign-state, especially in the developed world, lives on and still possesses 
considerable resources to respond to trans-sovereign terror movements.  
At the same time, the response of the US to 9/11 provokes the observation that 
globalisation and security are interconnected in terms of the increasing globalisation 
of military strategy. This occurs not just in the domain of the US ability to co-ordinate 
a global coalition stretching from Europe and even to Japan, with more passive 
support from the likes of China, but also to its ability to project its own military power 
unilaterally. If globalisation is conceived of as the transcendence of territorial and 
sovereign barriers, then US military action can be depicted in certain ways as the 
apogee of this. The US in the Afghan campaign has certainly demonstrated its 
progression, again driven by the leveraging of advanced technology, towards being 
able to exercise power with declining reference to geographical distance and time, and 
across the four dimensions of land, sea, and especially air and space. For instance, US 
commanders were able to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to gather real time 
information on enemy activities and to enable real time responses. In this sense, the 
US has moved one step closer to the realisation of the long-envisaged Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) and the global reach of its power to match that of its terrorist 
counterpart.23
The conflict in Afghanistan, though, has also demonstrated that the US has 
still not affected a totally globalised or post-modern military strategy. The US was not 
entirely free from territoriality in projecting its power in the Middle East, intent as it 
was to secure bases for its military forces in Saudi Arabia (unsuccessfully) and in the 
central Asian republics (with more success) for the assault on Afghanistan. The US 
was also forced to fight a ground war for the possession of territory, even if this was 
limited to the deployment of its own and coalition special forces, as well as the 
Northern Alliance as a proxy ground army. Above all, the US may have been able to 
limit its own engagement on the ground and resulting casualties, but its military 
campaign in traditional fashion wreaked untold devastation and pain on its enemies 
and non-combatants in Afghanistan.24
 
Conclusion: Globalisation and Future Responses to Insecurity 
 
This article has argued that globalisation provides a number of conceptual insights to 
assist understanding of the contemporary security agenda following 9/11. Differing 
definitions of globalisation, individually or in combination, can shed light on the 
motivations and facilitation of, as well as the responses to, the activities of al-Qaeda 
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and other extant forms of terrorism. Globalisation as liberalisation engenders tensions 
in the political economy of societies, which, when synergised with globalisation as the 
perception of convergence and Westernisation, can lay down the motivations for 
conflict. In turn, the actualisation of these conflicts is enhanced by globalisation as 
economic liberalisation and trans-territorialisation which enable terrorist groups to 
exploit areas of weakening sovereignty and to extend their activities along the same 
economic networks that are utilised by other agents of globalisation such as TNCs. 
The response of the US and other states to 9/11 also provides insights into the 
globalisation-security nexus. Globalisation, although it can generate security 
problems, can also be mastered by the developed states and its worst security excesses 
curbed given sufficient political will and urgency. Lastly, 9/11 is a demonstration of 
the increasing globalisation of military strategy and power, but simultaneously its 
continuing limitations.  
These observations lead to a final thought about the direction which the post-
9/11 and post-globalisation security agendas may take. 9/11 has indeed demonstrated 
the ability (or at least the effort) of the developed states to channel globalisation in 
their interests, to tame factors such as international finance, and to reverse the retreat 
of the state. If these states are intent on reshaping globalisation processes then they 
may have also hit upon the key to addressing the root causes of the political economy 
of insecurity that can give rise to the hyper-terrorism of Al Qaeda. However, the 
concern must be that the developed states have only learned a partial lesson from 
9/11. Despite all the talk of state-building in Afghanistan, in other areas of 
international policy the leading powers continue to adhere to policies of globalisation 
which are, as noted above, more oriented towards state-reducing. Therefore, unless 
there is an effort to harmonise globalisation with the as yet unfinished state-building 
efforts of other regions, then there will be no solution to trans-sovereign terrorism. 
Moreover, the meaning of state-building here should not be construed as simply Cold 
War-style Western support for the rigid and autocratic regimes of the Middle East, but 
an effort to move beyond the status quo and nurture the indigenous development of 
states that will best allow them to filter the benefits of globalisation whilst undergoing 
the transformation towards modernity. Added to this, 9/11’s confirmation of the 
ability of not only terrorist networks to transcend sovereignty but also major states 
such as the US to project power in a globalised fashion does not provide hope for easy 
solutions to global insecurity. For as long as the US defence community continues to 
possess the (perhaps mistaken) perception that it can tackle global terrorism with 
globalised military power, and thus pursue technical rather than genuine political 
solutions to the threat of terrorism, then insecurity and the threat of terrorism will 
persist.  
  
